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REINING IN JUDGES: THE CASE
OF HATE SPEECH
Judge Danny J. Boggs* **

J

am going to discuss the area of First Amendment free speech, as

connected to the reining in of judges. My thesis is that judges are
subject to legitimate efforts to rein them in only when their decisions
or their new principles are not applied evenhandedly to all, such as when
the nature or identity of the party seems to influence the outcome or the
principles that a judge puts into effect. In fact, one area where, at one
time or another, it seems as if every critic or every interest group has
wished to rein in judges is the area of free speech. One commentator,
Michael Kent Curtis,' posed it thusly, that Patrick Buchanan complains
that the Supreme Court has protected "criminals, atheists, homosexuals,
flag burners ... and pornographers, ' ' while Professor Catharine MacKinnon and critics on the Left attack them because they protect "Nazis,
Klansmen, and pornographers. '' 3 At the same time, the same general
principles enforced by judges have protected the speech of advocates of
integration, opponents of the war in Vietnam, and political radicals. I
would take as a lesson that this is one area where judges have indeed
stood up for neutral principles and that it has largely been the critics and,
most recently, a group of academic critics who have been wholly unable
or unwilling to propound a principled basis for their efforts at narrowing
First Amendment protections. That is the story that I want to talk about
today.
I
Obviously, the history of free speech in America could be the subject
not only of a lecture but of an entire course, so I will skate very quickly
over the fact that in America we have had a long struggle, going as far
back as the Alien and Sedition Acts, through some of the Civil War activities and rising to significant attacks of free speech during the World War
I and post World War II period. Over that time, there grew up a body of
* United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit. A.B., Harvard College, Cambridge; J.D., University of Chicago Law School; LL.D. (hon.) University of Detroit Mercy.
** Presented at Southern Methodist University School of Law on November 11, 1997,
as the Alfred D. Murrah Lecture.
1. See Michael Kent Curtis, "Free Speech" and Its Discontents: The Rebellion Against
General Propositionsand the Danger of Discretion, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 419 (1996).
2. Dan Balz, Buchanan Takes on the Judiciary, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 1996, at A8.
3.
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decisions leading to the overall idea, certainly by the 1950s and early
1960s, that we did not look at the ideas based on some intrinsic view of
their worth. Courts looked directly and narrowly only at a set of potential evil effects that were initially under the rubric of "clear and present
danger."'4 By the time of the case of Brandenburg v. Ohio in 1969, the
Supreme Court required an even stricter standard of an imminent, lawless action that the speaker both directed or intended to bring about and
was indeed likely to do so. 5 That essentially was the culmination of what
Harry Kalven, who was my mentor at the University of Chicago, referred
to as the free speech tradition. 6 You will find a lot of this laid out in an
interesting book compiled by Professor Kalven's son, Jamie Kalven,
called A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America.7 To me, the
bedrock of that tradition was that we do not distinguish, in terms of protecting speech, as to whether it expresses an idea that we approve of or
that we do not.
Mr. Justice Holmes, in the dissent in United States v. Schwimmer, put it
thusly: "[I]f there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free
thought-not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for
the thought that we hate."8 Mr. Justice Douglas in the Terminiello case in
the 1940s put it more powerfully, that "a function of free speech under
our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve
its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger." 9 Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking again in the Abrams case put it perhaps most
starkly, that "we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check
the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with
death." 10
That had become the firmly established doctrine as of the 1960s and
1970s. It was a doctrine that was adhered to by people across the political
spectrum. I am going to speak sometimes perhaps overly loosely of the
Left and the Right, but culture critics and observers of politics will understand what I am talking about. In the 1960s and 1970s, the attacks on
freedom of speech were primarily against speakers from the Left at the
time of Vietnam and the time of the civil rights movement. The political
Right, certainly in the academy, both students and faculty, was generally
more tolerant and supportive. It is both instructive and perhaps little
known that the original Berkeley Free Speech movement, before some
violence had intervened, included on its executive committee representa4. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
5. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
6. See HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965).
7. HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA
(Jamie Kalven ed., 1988).
dissenting).
8. 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J.,
9. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
dissenting).
10. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
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tives of the Young Republicans and of Youth for Goldwater. l1 Professor
Elana Kagan in the University of Chicago Law Review put it in academic
terms that:
[Tihe government may not restrict expressive activities because it
disagrees with or disapproves of the ideas espoused by the speaker; it
may not act on the basis of a view of what is a true (or false) belief ....
[T]he government cannot count as a harm, which it has a
legitimate interest in preventing, that ideas it considers faulty or abhorrent enter the public dialogue and challenge the official under12
standing of acceptability or correctness.
Now this, of course, does not mean that any individual or the society as
a whole may not come to a conclusion as to the good or evil of particular
ideas, and indeed I think we hope that they will exercise that thought and
that discretion. But this principle was perhaps put to its strongest test in
the Skokie case, in 1977, where a parade by Nazis through a suburb of
13
Chicago with a significant Jewish population was also permitted.
Thus it is not to say that society thought that all ideas were equal. I
think that it has been certainly part of the Zeitgeist, let us say, that Nazism was the ultimate evil, and that Communism was not looked at by the
reigning authorities in quite the same way. In 1969, Jane Fonda told a
college audience, "I would.., think that if you understood what communism was, you would pray on your knees, that we would someday become
communist."' 14 Certainly, Ms. Fonda has come under a lot of attack in the
years since, but I believe that if she had said the same thing about Nazism, her popularity would not have endured. And her husband, Ted Turner, confessed, "communism is fine with me. It's part of life on this
planet."'1 5 Again, had he said the same of Nazism, I doubt he would be a
major mogul today.
Well, that was the state of the law and academic beliefs up to the early
1980s. But starting in the early 1980s, in a series of articles by Professor
Charles Lawrence 1 6 and Professor Richard Delgado, 17 and really coming
to a flood in the late 1980s and early 1990s, in articles by Duke Professor
Stanley Fish,18 one of the leading "crits," and Professor Cass Sunstein 19
11. See Barbara Garson, Me and Mario Down by the Schoolyard: Recollections of the
Berkeley Free Speech Movement, THE PROGRESSIVE, Jan. 1, 1997, at 24.
12. Elana Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of GovernmentalMotive in
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 428 (1996) (footnote omitted).
13. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978); see also Skokie v. National
Socialist Party, 373 N.E.2d 21, 25 (Ill. 1978) (holding "use of the swastika is a symbolic
form of free speech entitled to first amendment protections").
14. Don Feder, Communism's Victims Get a Monument, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 16,
1993, at 33.

15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence 111, If He Hollers, Let Him Go: Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431 (1990).
17. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982).
18. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Fraught with Death: Skepticism, Progressivism, and the First
Amendment, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1061 (1993).
19. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CH. L. REV. 255 (1992).

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

from Chicago, among others, the critics made two major points. They
first said it's really not true that sticks and stones may break my bones
but words will never hurt me; that words really can hurt. Indeed, one of
the major documents of that movement is called Words that Wound.20
The second point that was made was that suppressing some speech really would make a better society-that there really is no good reason to
allow advocacy of racist, sexist, or fascist ideas. And at least in my observation, that was pretty much the extent of the analysis. I was rather bemused when I first began to read these articles because it seemed to me
that they had really overlooked or failed to address two very major and
obvious counterpoints. The first is that these arguments are not new.
None of those supporters of free speech, whether the justices or the academics, ever believed that words could not be harmful to people.
Whether you say to a Jew that Hitler was right or you say to a Ukranian
that Stalin was right, that is going to be distressing and upsetting. It certainly hurts people to have Communist speakers out there saying that it is
proper to liquidate the bourgeoisie or Jerry Rubin out there saying that it
is proper to kill your parents. 2 1 It would be a very shallow view of the
history of free speech controversies to think that the supporters of free
speech never thought that words could be harmful.
The second counter-argument is that none of those articles that addressed the question of whether society would be better off without some
kinds of speech ever considered that principle in light of the possibility of
attacks on the speech that came from their side of the spectrum. Certainly many people, perhaps more people, think that we would be a better society without propaganda in favor of drugs, in favor of Communism,
in favor of rioting, in favor of theft, yet those who spoke on that side were
also under the protection of the worthy tradition. Professor Curtis in the
Wake Forest Law Review put it as follows, "True hate speech and much
pornography, like much protected political speech, are evil. Evil ideas
can have evil consequences .... Bigoted speech can cause serious harm.

It can help produce a bigoted society. Equality is a key constitutional
value."'22 But one can simply take that same sentence and substitute
other words about producing other types of societies, that would eliminate other values that we hold dear and that have been under attack by
protected political speech.
The new academic authors did not repudiate those ringing old quotes
that I gave you from Abrams and Schwimmer, from Holmes and Douglas.23 They did not repudiate them directly, but either the authors of
those quotes, on the one hand, or the academics, on the other, really did
20. MARl J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY,
SAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993).

As-

21. See William M. Kunstler, 'Ruckeses' Abbie Hoffman Raised Were Part of the

Greening of America, Los ANGELES TIMES, April 19, 1989 (Metro Section) at 1-2.
22. Curtis, supra note 1, at 422-23 (citation omitted).
23. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). United
dissenting).
States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J.,
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not take them very seriously. When Holmes talked of freedom for the
speech we hate, did he really mean to refer to speech that we really, really hate? Did Holmes say it so easily because he really did not hate the
pacifist speech or the socialist speech at issue in those cases? Did Mr.
Justice Douglas in Terminiello, when he talked approvingly about upsetting people, do so because he thought it was okay to upset people with
certain types of speech and did not think about how it would be with
24
others?
I must say that the third quote I used from Justice Holmes was from
someone who really knew what he was talking about. Sometimes I think
Douglas's rhetoric ran beyond what he was seriously thinking about. But
when Holmes, in the Abrams quote, talked about being willing to hear
even speech that we believe to be fraught with death, that was something
Holmes knew about. Now, we think about Justice Holmes primarily from
his decisions in the 1920s and 1930s, but he had fought in the Civil War.
Not only that, he had been wounded on three occasions; at the time of
Holmes's death in 1935, it is almost inconceivable that this man had
fought at Antietam. Among his most intimate personal effects were a
small paper parcel with a note reading: "These [musket balls] were taken
from my body in the Civil War," and two Civil War uniforms with a note,
"the stains upon them are my blood."'25 Now a man who had gone
through that and still made that kind of statement, I think he at least
knew what he was talking about and believed in it.
I began to think that there are three possibilities that could support the
views of these academics. Maybe they have not been willing to put these
forward, but I see only three possibilities. The first one is that they simply wanted to go back to the views of critics of free speech, as in the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in Terminiello, which said that a
too even-handed approach could be corrosive of our national values and
"convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact."'26 Now if
these people who had supported free speech in the past had made a mea
culpa and said, "We were wrong, Justice Jackson was really right and we
should go back to that," that would be one way at least of justifying their
current position on an even-handed basis. I have not seen any of them do
that.
The second possibility is essentially one of pure power. It says that in
the 1950s and 1960s we wanted freedom for our speech because we didn't
have power, but now that we have the power to suppress others, we will
do it. Whether or not that is what the critics actually believe, that is not
the principle they have put forward, so we will pass that one.
The third possibility, although very few have put it forward, is that
there could be some principled distinction, whereby speech, however de24. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
25. Woody West, Justice Holmes: The Man and the Myth, INSIGHT

21, 1991, at 42, available in 1991 WL 5801558.
26. 337 U.S. at 37 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

MAGAZINE,

Aug.
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fined to be of a racist, or sexist, or fascist nature, was in some way qualitatively and definitively worse than speech of a Communist or Socialist, or
some other nature. If the critics could come forward with a good theory
of that sort, then that would be something we could at least debate. Failing that, as Professor Eugene Volokh of UCLA Law School said when he
looked at some of these articles that suggested revisiting Brandenburg:
There are certainly good arguments in favor of revisiting Brandenburg. But the one thing that I think should be stressed is that if one
revisits it, one will have to revisit it for everyone: for people who
advocate killing abortion doctors, for people who advocate Communist revolution (how many murders did Das Kapital incite?), for people who advocate holy wars (Christian, Moslem, or what have you),
for people who advocate race riots, and so on.
This might, in fact, be the best reason not to revisit Brandenburg.
Certainly speech can influence people to do incredibly nasty things.
But if that's a justification, boy, will a lot of speech will be up for
27
grabs.
Now one professor I will acknowledge has at least made an effort. Professor Mari Matsuda, in an article in the Michigan Law Review in 1989,
said, essentially, that it's really right that we can't distinguish the kinds of
hate speech we want to suppress on any content-neutral basis that will
not also be undermining free speech as a whole. 28 But she said we can
tell why racist speech is worse than Communist speech, so that it can be
suppressed. She said it is because there is no government in the world
that is officially racist, but there are lots of governments in the world that
are officially Communist. So, we will count heads, and if a speech has
sufficient international support, then that is going to be the reason it cannot be suppressed.
Of course, 1989 was a particularly poor year in which to make that
argument, as the number of Communist countries began to sink rather
rapidly close to zero. There is also a more philosophical point of opposition, which asks why American free speech doctrine should rest on what
other countries are espousing. Under that principle, if we were to have a
rise of avowedly racist or fascist governments abroad, then suddenly that
speech would become better protected, and as the number of Communist
countries fell toward zero, that speech would not be protected.
That is the only explicit effort to make a distinction that I have seen,
and as I say, I do not think that it succeeds at all.
That summarizes what I would call the academic attack on the tradition. Given the success of a whole series of academic movements, from
expansion of torts, to various types of civil rights litigation, to criminal
procedure protections, one might have thought that this flood of academic writing, which while it was criticized in the academy certainly had
27. Eugene Volokh, In "The Limits of Hate Speech: An On-Line Exchange,"

LEGAL

TIMES, May 1, 1995, at 17.

28. See Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).
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by far the preponderance of numbers of articles, might lead to some echoes in and favorable reception by the courts. But instead, I think the
history is that it ran into a complete stone wall. You might call it a counterattack by the courts on the academic attack or simply a rejection of it
(because, of course, the courts don't get into these things until somebody
brings a case to them). But the court history, as I say, has been almost a
complete rejection.
It began most notably in 1989 in a case called Doe v. University of
Michigan.29 The University of Michigan, a state institution, and therefore
generally subject to First Amendment free speech principles, had enacted
a fairly garden-variety university speech code. It had received some
favorable attention because it was at least rumored that it had been vetted by the Michigan Law School and by leading academics there. 30 An
action was brought against this code by a graduate student who said that
his speech was being chilled by not being able to say things that might be
considered actionable and offensive under the code. Judge Avern Cohn
of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, a
Carter appointee, who would generally be considered as one of the more
liberal judges on the court, simply demolished the code in an extensive
but not extremely respectful opinion, simply reciting the litany of free
speech cases and adding one that concerns speech in the sense of symbolic speech, West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette. That was the
flag salute case containing the famous quotation that "no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion. '3 1 Indeed, after Judge Cohn's ringing
rejection, the University went back to the drawing boards and did not
even try to appeal.
In 1992, the Supreme Court of the United States decided a case called
R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul,which began with perhaps the most infamous of
political symbols, a burning cross, being placed on the lawn of a black
family in Saint Paul. 32 Of course, that act could easily have been prose-

cuted under any number of other statutes. It constituted trespass; it constituted arson; it probably constituted what in Kentucky we call terroristic
threatening, but the statute under which it was prosecuted instead forbade the placement on any property, even your own property, of any
"symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but
not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has
reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others
'33
on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.
This was the statute that went to the Supreme Court and, of course,
from the terms of the statute as I read it, the statute was broad enough to
29. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
30. See id. at 855.

31. Id. at 863 (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943)).
32. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
33. Id. at 380 (citing ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
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cover, for example, a Nazi party flying a swastika flag over its own property and headquarters. It would not have covered a Communist party
flying the hammer and sickle because, presumably, it would offend everybody, or at least would not distinguish on the basis of race, creed, color,
or gender. So on those two bases, and the basis of a perhaps novel doctrine of underbreadth, rather than overbreadth, the Supreme Court unanimously by outcome (although there were, I believe, four opinions) struck
down this attempt to differentiate among kinds of speech.
Most recently, in 1995, in Corry v. Leland Stanford Junior University, a
state court decision rendered under a state First Amendment analog, a
similar decision was reached on what Stanford had thought was a code
that was even narrower and more nuanced (as the phrase is). 34 Now the
reason that this rested on a First Amendment principle is that in California, there is a law called the Leonard Law 35 stating that California private
schools are subject to the same restrictions as are imposed by the First
Amendment. A California state court struck down the Stanford code because it banned "fighting words," but only fighting words that grew out of
sex or race considerations, not out of political considerations. So, it was
improper to say unkind things about a person because of their sex or
race, but it is not impermissible to, for example, (and it was quite common, at least when I was in school) call someone a fascist. The California
court struck that down, and again the University did not even appeal.
Professor Gerhard Casper, who had been the Dean at the University of
Chicago Law School, then became the President of Stanford. Although
expressing some dismay, he decided not to take the case up and get an
even more resounding appellate judgment against the University.
So, we have an academic attack. We have the court counterattack,
based again not on denying that harm may occur, but on indicating that
the application of the laws must be even-handed. We cannot say we are
going to look at harm from one group and not harm from another and we
are not going to undermine the overall principle that simply avoiding individual emotional harm is not a ground for violating free speech. I
would add as a footnote, not a direct holding but the implication of the
Supreme Court's decision in Rosenberger v. University of Virginia in
1995.36 This was the case in which the University of Virginia funded various student publications that could be considered of all sorts of views,
even anti-Christian from a political point of view, but would not fund an
overtly Christian publication. The Supreme Court held by five to four
34. No. 740309, slip op. at 40-42 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1995) available in The Robert
Crown Law Library: Stanford Law School (last modified Jan. 24, 1996) <http://
www.stanford.edu/group/law/library/what/corrybc.html>; see also Symposium, Voices of the
People: Essays on ConstitutionalDemocracy in Memory of Professor Julian N. Eule, 45
UCLA L.R. 1537, 1634 n.299 (1998). John A. Russ, Shall We Dance? Gay Equality and
Religious Exemptions at Private CaliforniaHigh School Proms, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 71,
123 n.82 (1998).
35. See CAL. EDUC. CODE f48950 (West 1998) (applying to elementary and secondary
shcools); CAL. EDUC. CODE f943671a) (West 1997) (applying to post secondary education).
36. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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that even on the grounds that state spending was involved they could not
make this discrimination; and certainly from the decisions on both sides,
it would have been perfectly clear had the school decided to say that we
are going to suppress the Christian speech but not the anti-Christian
speech that such a code would have gone down nine to zero, with little
37
debate.
So, that is the historical status of the free speech doctrine today. I want
to say a few things about what I consider the cultural background of this.
That is, given what I thought would be the legal outcome, why did the
critics press forward? How were they blind to the faults in their reasonings? Why did they start in on this argument in the first place? And
here, as I say, I am talking culture, not law. It is my opinion that for all
the talk in the legal academy of story-telling, of empathy for persons of
different experience, that the critics simply could not conceive that the
harm they could see in racist or sexist speech could also be a harm in
political speech, in anti-family speech, or any other type of speech.
They could not conceive of what a Ukranian or Cambodian might think
about Communist speech. They could not conceive of a person like a
friend of mine who is an immigrant doctor from the former Soviet Union
who said she had a very hard time going to Les Miserables (a play that I
think is wonderful) because the revolutionaries are waving red flags.
That to her was as hurtful as was a swastika to a Jew, or a burning cross to
a black person. That is something, I think, these academics could not
even conceive of.
Professor Catharine MacKinnon, who has been very active in this area,
was asked about an incident at the University of Pennsylvania where the
student newspaper had run an article critical of affirmative action and of
Malcolm X, and a student group seized all the copies of the newspapers
and burned them. Professor MacKinnon said, "[t]here is expressive value
in what the students did, and there is also expressive value in letting the
paper publish," and she was not prepared to try to balance between these
38
two.

I was immediately struck by this, because as Winston Churchill

said, "I decline utterly to be impartial as between the fire brigade and the
39
fire. "
And it is certainly clear that Professor MacKinnon would not have the
same view had it been a male supremacist group that had been burning a
women's magazine. So the simple failure of understanding or imagination, I think, is one part.
The second part, I think, is that in the 1980s and as we moved into the
1990s, there was essentially a decline of the Left on a world wide basis,
certainly in the cultural and intellectual areas. Earlier, the Left both tac37. See id. at 819-20.
38. Anthony Lewis, First Amendment, Under Fire from the Left, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13,
1994 (Magazine), at 42.
39. 4 SIR WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: HIS COMPLETE
SPEECHES 4034 (Robert Rhodes James ed., 1974).
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tically and strategically found the principle of equality of ideas to be useful and favorable. Tactically, because the Left was likely to be the main
target of efforts to suppress speech and strategically because by and large
in the 1950s and 1960s, it seemed that the ideas of the Left were winning.
That is, in an open competition, the Left-whether you think of the Left
as radicalism or socialism at home, or Communism abroad-saw itself by
and large as being on the march.
As we got into the 1980s, with the rise of Margaret Thatcher in England, of Reagan in the United States, and then the complete collapse of
Communism abroad, this no longer seemed to be the case. The tactical
and strategic advantages of a doctrine of equality were no longer working
as they once had. I see many of the academic articles as having been an
attempt to relegitimize that point of view by attacking other ideas and
indicating that ideas were no longer equal in legal protection, and that
implicitly, their ideas were better because the others were worse, as
shown by the arguments for suppressing them. Thus, we have seen in the
case of Timothy McVeigh, an attack on a truly hideous book, called The
Turner Diaries,40 as having been the blueprint for his notion of race war,
ignoring at the same time that Pol Pot, who told us that he slept peacefully, was directly inspired by the writings of Marx to impose his ideas of
41
the equality of death on Cambodia.
So the idea that we should try to suppress only at the bad ideas from
one side and not on the other, I think is, at bottom, what has stimulated
these attacks. There was also the shock of opposition to left ideas and
attacks coming even on the campus itself. Perhaps the most intriguing
example of this was a set of incidents that occurred at Yale in the 1970s
and 1980s. In 1975, Professor C. Vann Woodward, the famous historian
of the South and of racial issues, led a committee that made a report to
President Giamatti, basically upholding in the strictest terms the free
speech tradition. 42 Giamatti, as you know, then went on to become the
43
commissioner of baseball.
In 1986, Yale was in an uproar. A set of posters that announced and
supported, with appropriate pictures, GLAD, or Gay and Lesbian
Awareness Days, found itself mocked by a student who put up posters
supporting "Bestiality Awareness Day," or BAD.'4 The student was
promptly brought up on charges and suspended from Yale for two years
until Professor Woodward and others came to his defense. Professor
Benno Schmidt, a law professor and Dean of the Columbia Law School,
had become President of Yale University and ultimately rescinded the
punishment.45 But that is just one example, and I say why did this all
40. William L. Pierce, writing as
(1978).
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See
See
See
See
See

ANDREW MACDONALD, THE TURNER DIARIES

Jeff Jacoby, Pol Pot's Clear Conscience, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 4, 1997, at A17.
Yale's Beastly Behavior, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 1986, at 30.
id.
Yale's Beasty Beharior,supra note 42.
id.
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start? People on the Left found themselves under attack from unexpected quarters rather than being the attackers.
Before I finish, let me say that one of the criticisms of a position such
as mine, which as I say was the tradition when I was coming through
school, is that it is a position of moral skepticism; that we simply believe
that all ideas are equal. Justice Holmes was thus attacked in one of the
articles that I have cited. As I say, I think that, looking at Holmes's life
that is not a fair criticism of Holmes, for not believing in anything, and I
know that for myself, I do not think I am a moral skeptic at all. I think I
am very clear on what ideas I think are better than others. But what I do
believe is that I disdain giving to others or even to myself the power to
impose by governmental force that nonskeptical view that I have of the
world. It is fine for me or any individual to decide for ourselves what are
the true ideas. But the power to decide when it is true enough to impose
on others is one that I do not claim for myself. And it is certainly one
that I do not wish to give to others.
So, to summarize, I believe we have a First Amendment doctrine that
has served us well. There will certainly continue to be close questions in
individual cases, such as, the concept of what is a present danger; what is
imminent lawlessness; when is speech brigaded with action enough to be
restricted; or when do we apply conventional libel law or the Garrison v.
Louisiana principle of punishment for false statements of fact.46 But all
of these issues can be decided on neutral principles, independent of who
the speech favors or who it attacks. If we face those questions with a
clear eye to the nature of the actions and the words, not to who the
speakers are or what the words espoused, we will best serve both political
discussion and freedom from arbitrary government power.
I will predict, both as a matter of constitutional law and of policy, that
all efforts at speech regulation will fail that are not put forth under what I
would call "the Golden Rule of Speech": that we will suppress the speech
of others only under the same kind of rules by which we are willing to
allow others to suppress our speech. And I believe that we will continue
our worthy tradition where government keeps its hands off virtually all
speech without trying to decide whether that speech, in the view of the
government or the governors, is worthy or unworthy.

46. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).

282

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

Comments

